Hackers inject credit card, crypto-stealing malware into 178 major websites
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Cointelegraph by Felix Ng

A major supply chain attack on the Optimizely platform compromised 178 global brands, including the BBC and Zoom. The malicious JavaScript enabled credential theft, credit card skimming, and iOS exploit distribution.
The Optimizely Supply Chain Compromise: An Analysis
On 16 November 2026, a massive supply chain cyberattack sent shockwaves through the digital ecosystem as 178 major organizations were compromised via the Optimizely Web experimentation platform. By injecting malicious JavaScript into the service, attackers effectively weaponized a trusted third-party tool used for A/B testing and website optimization, turning some of the world's most visited sites—including Zoom, the BBC, CNN, and Salesforce—into conduits for malware.
Mechanics of the 'Optimjack' Campaign
The campaign, identified by security researcher Amirul Iman as 'Optimjack,' represents a sophisticated multi-purpose threat. The injected scripts were designed to perform several illicit activities simultaneously. Beyond simple data exfiltration, the malware actively monitored user interactions to swap legitimate cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker-controlled ones, leading to verified financial losses. Furthermore, the script functioned as a digital skimmer, capturing sensitive credit card information entered into website forms, and harvested session cookies and screenshots to facilitate broader unauthorized access.
Exploiting the Mobile Frontier
The scope of the attack extended beyond traditional desktop browsers. Security reports indicate that the malicious payload specifically targeted mobile users, delivering the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits to visitors on iPhones and iPads. This inclusion of mobile-specific exploits highlights the evolving nature of supply chain attacks, where threat actors seek to compromise devices at the kernel or browser level to bypass standard web-based security measures.
Broader Implications for Third-Party Vendors
This incident underscores the fragility of modern web infrastructure, which relies heavily on third-party scripts. Because companies like IKEA, HSBC, and Equifax trust platforms like Optimizely to manage their web experimentation, they inadvertently granted attackers a gateway to their users. When a central utility provider is compromised, the 'blast radius' is exponential, as evidenced by the 178 diverse global brands affected simultaneously.
The Role of Detection and Future Trends
As noted by Report URI, this attack highlights the urgent necessity for advanced monitoring tools capable of identifying unexpected changes to trusted JavaScript. The ability to detect new scripts being loaded in real-time is no longer a luxury but a requirement for enterprise-level security. Moving forward, we can expect a shift toward 'Zero Trust' approaches regarding third-party scripts, where organizations will likely implement stricter Content Security Policies (CSP) and subresource integrity checks to ensure that even if a vendor is compromised, the injected code cannot execute.
Conclusion
The Optimizely breach serves as a stark reminder that the security of a global brand is only as strong as its weakest third-party dependency. As attackers continue to target the 'pipes' of the internet—the platforms that serve content and scripts to millions—the industry must pivot toward more robust, automated detection systems. The damage caused by the Optimjack campaign, ranging from direct crypto theft to sophisticated mobile exploits, marks a significant escalation in the threat landscape for 2026.
Multiple Citing Sources